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COMMENTS 
Compensating the Handicapped: An Approach to 
Determining the Appropriateness of Damages for 
Violations of Section 504 
Enacted as a relatively minor part of a comprehensive pack- 
age of federal assistance programs for the handicapped,' section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" has become the principal 
weapon in the fight for civil rights for the handicapped. This 
statutory declaration of federal anti-discrimination policy, like 
earlier prohibitions of discrimination based on races and sex,' 
simply banned discrimination against the handicapped in pro- 
grams receiving federal funds: "No otherwise qualified handi- 
capped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by rea- 
son of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'" 
For nearly one in eleven Americans: section 504 promised vastly 
1. Section 504, as finally structured, was added by the House-Senate Conference 
Committee. The section was not the subject of debate in the conference or on the floor of 
either house. Those commentators who have suggested that the section has a substantial 
legislative history have usually quoted from the general purposes of the statute and the 
arguments of supporters in favor of its passage or have used comments made during 
consideration of the 1974 and 1978 amendments. See, e.g., Note, Implied Rights of Ac- 
tion Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 68 GEO. L. J. 1229, 1245-46 (1980) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Implied Rights of Action]. 
2. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codifled in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.). 
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Language similar to § 
504 appears at  601 (§ 2000d): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." 
4. Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681 (1976). Language sim- 
ilar to § 504 appears at 8 901 (5 1681(a)): "No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . ." 
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 8 504, 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976). 
6. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, ONE IN ELEVEN 2 
(1975). 
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increased access to government and society. 
A general statement of a policy prohibiting discrimination, 
however, could not, without an effective sanction or remedy, 
bring the changes in government and society that the enactment 
of section 504 contemplated. The promulgation of an Executive 
order authorizing the withdrawal of federal funds from programs 
discriminating against the handicapped7 did little to help those 
who felt they deserved something more than they had received 
under earlier federal statutes, which provided assistance pro- 
grams but neglected handicapped rights.' Turning to the courts 
to enforce section 504, handicapped citizens attempted to force 
changes in such areas as mass transit planning: university hand- 
icapped assistance programs,1° and employment practices.ll 
Each court hearing a section 504 suit initially faced the question 
of whether a private right of action existed under section 504." 
So far, "every court of appeals which [has] considered the issue 
[has] found a private right of action under Section 504."18 
Despite the courts' willingness to protect the rights of the 
7. Exec. Order No. 11,914,3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 5 794 app., at 
881 (1976). 
8. The predecessors of the Rehabilitation Act, referred to as the vocational rehabili- 
tation acts, did not address the question of the rights of the handicapped, but rather 
concentrated on establishing programs to "rehabilitate" them, i.e., to make them em- 
ployable in competition with non-handicapped persons. S. REP. NO. 318, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2078-79. 
9. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). 
10. Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, - U.S. - (1981). 
11. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. de- 
nied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979); Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. cal. 1979). 
12. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 did not mention the existence of a private rem- 
edy for violation of 5 504. Before granting relief to private litigants, courts have been 
forced to find that a private right of action was implied in the enactment of § 504. 
13. Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on 
other grounds, - U.S. - (1981). Despite the blanket assertion in Camenisch, two Cir- 
cuit Courts of Appeals have found that private rights of action under § 504 do not exist 
in some cases where the wrong to be remedied is employment discrimination. Carmi v. 
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1980); Trageser v. Libbie 
Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978). Both courts based their decision on 
the provision, added in 1978, that Title VI remedies would be available to 8 504 plain- 
tiffs. 620 F.2d at 674-75; 590 F.2d at 89. That reasoning was explicitly rejected in a re- 
cent employment suit brought in a federal district court. Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 
F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The problem involves Title VI's restriction of private ac- 
tions in employment cases to those in which employment was the primary purpose of the 
federal financial assistance. Since Title VI, unlike Title M, was aimed at employment 
discrimination, the restriction serves a different purpose in Title VI suits. If it is to apply 
at  all in 8 504 cases, it should apply only to cases involving employment discrimination. 
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handicapped by enforcing private rights of action under section 
504, remedies for handicapped plaintiffs have been almost exclu- 
sively limited to prospective relief in the form of injunctions and 
declaratory judgments.14 A few plaintiffs found that prospective 
relief was not enough and asked to be compensated for the 
losses they suffered as a result of the section 504 violations. In 
decisions filed in early 1980, two United States district courts 
came to opposite conclusions concerning the availability of dam- 
ages as a remedy. This Comment suggests that the proper ap- 
proach to deal with requests for damages for section 504 viola- 
tions is found in Davis v. Passman,16 a 1979 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision allowing damages in a constitutionally implied action 
for discrimination based on sex. 
A. Legislative History of Section 504 
After several drafts, two Presidential vetoes,16 and 
thousands of hours of research and negotiations Congress passed 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'' The Act's passage indicated 
that the federal government had finally awakened to the needs 
of handicapped citizens. The Act's predecessor, the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act,18 had been designed to direct federal assis- 
tance to those handicapped individuals who, with additional 
training and assistance, could become employable.lS The new 
statute was more comprehensive. It included assistance even for 
those so seriously disabled that their employment was appar- 
ently impo~sible.'~ 
While the rest of the new Rehabilitation Act outlined a 
14. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Loa Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 12'7 (5th Cir. 1980), redd on other grounds, 
-_ U.S. - (1981). NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Lloyd 
v. Regional Tramp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). 
15. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
16. S. REP. NO. 318,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-16, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 2076, 2087-90. 
17. "The [Rehabilitation] Act thus represents the first federal attempt to prohibit 
discrimination against the handicapped outside the civil service." Implied Rights of Ac- 
tion, supra note 1, at  1229 (footnotes omitted). 
18. The "Vocational Rehabilitation Act" is the name popularly given to a series of 
statutes passed between 1920 and 1968. For a history of the Acts, see S. REp. NO. 318, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2082-84. 
19. Id. at  5, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at  2079. 
20. Id. at  9, reprinted in [I9731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at  2092. 
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comprehensive package of federally managed or assisted pro- 
grams, section 504 addressed the civil rights of the handicapped 
individuals to whom those programs were to be directed. Section 
504's ban against discrimination extended beyond the Rehabili- 
tation Act's programs, proscribing "discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assi~tance.'"~ 
That language was soon amended to include federally operated 
as well as federally assisted programs within section 504's anti- 
discrimination mandate? 
The broad language of section 504 paralleled earlier federal 
efforts to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex in educa- 
tional programs receiving federal funds: Title IX2' required 
schools to provide equal facilities for men and women;24 section 
504 forced institutions receiving federal funds to modify struc- 
tures to provide equal access for blind, deaf, paraplegic, and 
other handicapped  individual^.'^ Administrative interpretation 
of section 504 stipulated that "[elach program and activity [re- 
ceiving federal funds], when viewed in its entirety, must be read- 
ily accessible to handicapped  person^.'"^ Hence, new structures 
would have to be built to accommodate any handicapped person 
wishing to participate in the programs the structure would 
house.27 
The threat of huge financial burdens resulting from these 
21. 29 U.S.C. 8 794 (1976) (emphasis added). 
22. Congress added to the coverage of federally assisted programs "any program or 
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service." 
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 
(amending 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1976)). 
23. Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). 
24. Although Title IX did not explicitly refer to equal facilities, subsequent admin- 
istrative interpretations consistently have required equal facilities for men's and 
women's programs. For example, HEW regulations regarding athletic facilities require 
the following: 
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscho- 
lastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportu- 
nities are available the Director will consider, among other factors: 
. . . .  
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; 
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; 
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services . . . . 
34 C.F.R. $ 106.41(c) (1980). 
25. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION 
ACT OF 1973: BRIEFING UIDE 8 (1980). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 9. 
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construction requirements led to considerable debate on the 
merits of restricting the broad section 504 mandate." However, 
whereas debate over Title IX resulted in the enactment of sig- 
nificant limitations on the reach of federal sex discrimination 
bans into the functioning of the nation's schools," few limita- 
tions have been placed on the range of activities covered by sec- 
tion 504?O 
B. Enforcement of Section 504 
The legislative history of section 504 indicates that it was 
modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972.31 Since Congress had not 
included a method for enforcing section 504 in the Rehabilita- 
tion Act of 1973, the basic remedy used in enforcing Title VI 
and Title IX was applied to section 504 by an Executive order 
issued in 1976: "Whenever the appropriate department or 
agency determines . . . that any recipient of, or applicant for, 
Federal financial assistance is in noncompliance . . . compliance 
with section 504 may be effected by the suspension or termina- 
tion of, or refusal to award Federal financial assistance . . . . 9932 
Under this enforcement scheme, funds were withdrawn from the 
specific program found to be violating the statute's anti-discrim- 
ination requirement." Other programs operated by the same 
agency or institution continued to receive federal assistance un- 
28. The principal area of concern, primarily because of the amount of money in- 
volved, has been mass transit. See, e.g., Mass Transit for the Disabled, 66 A.B.A.J. 425 
(1980). So far, 8 504 has not been amended to reflect that concern. 
29. Title IX exempts a number of groups and institutions from its equal-opportu- 
nity mandate: religious institutions, military and merchant marine academies, single-sex 
colleges, some fraternities, sororities and voluntary youth service organizations (such as 
Boy Scouts), Boys' and Girls' State activities, father-son and mother-daughter activities, 
and some beauty pageants. 20 U.S.C. 8 1681(a)(3)-(9) (1976). 
30. It is important to note that the 8 504 mandate extended only to "otherwise qual- 
ified" handicapped individuals. Although there is little in the legislative history to clarify 
the meaning of this term, the Supreme Court has used it to limit the coverage of 5 504. 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-07 (1979). 
31. S. REP. NO. 1297,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [I9741 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 6373, 6390. 
32. Exec. Order No. 11, 914 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 8 794 
app., at 881 (1976). 
33. Id. at 3(c). A similar limitation was placed on Title VI enforcement. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d-1 (1976). For a discussion of the impact of that limitation in the Title VI context, 
see Karst, Federal Remedies, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1025, 1049 (1977). The same limita- 
tion has been imposed on actions for enforcement of Title IX. See Othen v. Ann Arbor 
School Bd., No. 79-73709 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1981). 
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ti1 they had each been shown to violate the requirement? 
The relief provided by the Executive order, and later by ad- 
ministrative rules:' was limited to the withdrawal of or refusal 
to provide federal funds to offending programs. For ongoing pro- 
grams funding continued until a finding was made that discrimi- 
nation had taken place, at which time federal assistance was dis- 
continued. The remedy was entirely prospective; no provision 
was made for providing relief to those who had already suffered 
as a result of violations. 
Even before the Executive order was issued, enforcement of 
the section 504 mandate had begun. As early as 1976, suits by 
private parties resulted in verdicts in favor of handicapped 
 plaintiff^.^^ Although the promulgation of regulations under sec- 
tion 504 in 1977 may have had some negative effect on private 
section 504 enforcement actions," such actions continue to be 
successfully litigated? 
Private litigants prevailed in a number of federal district 
courts and courts of appeals before Southeastern Community 
College v. Daviss9 presented the Supreme Court with its first op- 
portunity to decide a section 504 case. Davis, a hearing-impaired 
student, alleged that Southeastern Community College, a recipi- 
ent of federal financial assistance, refused her application to 
enter a nursing program because of her handicap.40 The Court 
decided that Davis was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual" within the meaning of the statute.41 By determining 
that Davis' alleged right to enter the nursing program was not a 
right protected by section 504, the Court avoided deciding the 
question of the existence of a private right of action." 
Had the Court decided the private right of action question 
in Davis, it probably would have followed the precedent it had 
set only four weeks earlier in a case involving sex discrimination 
34. See id. 
35. 45 C.F.R. $8 85.1-.58 (1979). 
36. The first 8 504 case was Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W. Va. 
1976). 
37. Miener suggests that it may be more difficult to successfully pursue private ac- 
tions for enforcement of 8 504 now that the administrative enforcement machinery is in 
place. Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 944, 947 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
38. The most recent decision supporting the existence of a private right of action 
under $ 504 is Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980). 
39. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). 
40. Id. at 402. 
41. Id. at 405-07, 413-14. 
42. Id. at 404-05 n.5. 
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in violation of a similar anti-discrimination statute, Title IX. In 
Cannon u. University of Chi~ago,'~ the Court found that Con- 
gress' failure to specifically provide a private right of action did 
not prevent the courts from finding that such a right did exist 
when it was asserted under a statute focusing on a specific 
benefitted class and when the plaintiff was a member of that 
class.44 The Court would presumably resolve a section 504 suit 
by applying the Cannon approach to protect handicapped indi- 
viduals in the same manner that women are protected under Ti- 
tle IX. The result would be to uphold the various circuit courts 
of appeals in their decisions that a private right of action exists 
under section 504. Partially as a result of its analysis of Cannon, 
the circuit court that has most recently considered the question 
concluded that "both the legislative history of the Rehabilitation 
Act and the analogy to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
. . . [support] the existence of [a private] right [of action] .'"' 
C. Remedies Available Under Section 504 
Although federal courts have agreed that a private right of 
action may properly be implied under section 504, there is still 
considerable debate over the remedies available to those exert- 
ing such a right. The legislative history of section 504 makes no 
reference to private remedies." Even when amending the statute 
to specifically allow recovery of attorneys fees:' Congress did 
not give any indication of the direction courts should take in 
evaluating the appropriateness of different remedies. Although 
courts have found injunctive relief to be appropriate where pri- 
vate rights of action have been upheld," they have not agreed on 
the availability of compensation in the form of damages. 
On January 25, 1980, two United States district courts were 
43. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
44. Id. at 689-709,717. 
45. Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d at 878. See also Patton v. Dumpson, 
498 F. Supp. 933, 937 (1980). 
46. In fact, there is little mention of 5 504 in the legislative history of the Rehabili- 
tation Act. The language in the committee reports simply suggests that the provision was 
modeled after Title VI and Title IX and was intended to reach similar goals. S. REP. NO. 
1297,93d Cong., 2d Seas. 39-40, reprinted in [I9741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 
6390. 
47. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 
1978, 29 U.S.C. 8 794(a) (Supp. I11 1979). 
48. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d at 880; Camenisch v. Univer- 
sity of Tex., 616 F.2d at 130. 
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petitioned to provide a damages remedy for section 504 viola- 
tions. Both cases involved handicapped children who had alleg- 
edly been denied appropriate educational opportunities by pro- 
grams receiving federal financial assistance. Both courts faced 
the issue on motions to dismiss the section 504 claims. One court 
found that damages may be an appropriate remedy when a 
cause of action under section 504 has been established; the other 
court adamantly denied such a remedy. 
1. Miener v. Missouri 
The availability of a damages remedy was rejected by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
in Miener u. M i s s o ~ r i . ~ @  Terri Ann Miener was a child who 
needed educational facilities that the local public schools (which 
received federal funds) refused to provide.6o Her father sued the 
State of Missouri and local school officials in her behalf, alleging 
that the defendants had been discriminating against the plaintiff 
because of her serious physical and emotional disorders." The 
defendants moved to dismiss the section 504 claim on the 
ground that a private right of action for damages did not exist 
under section 504.62 
The court conceded that, as the plaintiff had argued, 
"[plrior to the adoption of [the section 5041 regulations, it was 
generally held that Section 504 could be enforced through a pri- 
vate cause of a ~ t i o n . " ~  The court then distinguished Miener's 
claim from earlier suits in which handicapped individuals had 
successfully asserted section 504 claims on two grounds: the ear- 
lier suits had been decided before regulations had been promul- 
gatedM and they had not involved claims for damages." 
In evaluating the validity of Miener's claim for compensa- 
tory relief, the court looked at the damages action in light of the 
criteria outlined by the Supreme Court in Cort u. Ash? Applied 
in virtually every implied right of action case since Cort was de- 
cided, these four criteria constituted the test to be used in deter- 
49. 498 F. Supp. 944 (1980). 
50. Id. at 945-46. 
51. Id. at 945. 
52. Id. at 946. 
53. Id. at 947. 
54. Id. at 946-47. 
55. Id. at 948. 
56. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
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mining whether a private right of action could be found implied 
in a statute: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial bene- 
fit the statute was enacted" . . . ? Second, is there any indica- 
tion of the legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to cre- 
ate such a remedy or to deny one ? . . . Third, is it consistent 
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply 
such a remedy for the plaintiff ? . . . And finally, is the cause 
of action one traditionally relegated to state law . . . 
In Miener, the court found that the plaintiff was "undoubt- 
edly" a member of the special class for which the statute had 
been enacteds8 and that discrimination against the handicapped 
was "not an area of primary concern to the States."se But the 
court found that the legislative history of section 504 did not 
contain "the slightest indication" that private damage suits were 
contemplated by its enactment:O and that " [t] he implication of 
such damage suits would also be inconsistent with the legislative 
scheme."61 The court's application of the second and third Cort 
factors led it to conclude that a private right of action could not 
be implied. The plaintiffs claims under section 504 were dis- 
missed, leaving the case to be tried on the remaining causes of 
action.62 
2. Patton v. Dumpson 
Rather than join the Eastern District of Missouri in re- 
jecting a claim for damages under section 504, the Southern Dis- 
trict of New York found in Patton u. Dumpson6' that damages 
could appropriately be granted to a handicapped plaintiff. The 
fact situation was similar to that of Miener: A handicapped 
child did not receive the education to which he was entitled 
from an agency that received federal financial assistance." Be- 
cause William Patton had been abandoned by his parents, he 
57. Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
58. 498 F. Supp. at 948. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 949. In another opinion, the Miener court found that even a grant of com- 
pensatory relief in the form of additional future educational assistance to Terri Ann 
Miener would not be permissible. Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
63. 498 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
64. Id. at 936. 
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was the legal responsiblity of certain public and private welfare 
agencies in New York City.66 Suit was brought in his behalf 
against those agencies, alleging that Patton had been "denied an 
education solely because he suffered from certain physical and 
mental handi~aps."~~ 
Rather than apply the Cort criteria, the Patton court found 
that the existence of an implied right of action under section 504 
had already been established by the various circuit courts of ap- 
peals that had considered the question.67 Then, separating the 
question of the existence of the right of action from that of the 
appropriate remedy, the court found that there was "no prece- 
dent for limiting a private right of action under Section 504 to 
suits for injunctive relief in the absence of a Congressional direc- 
tive to that effect."" Damages had been granted in cases involv- 
ing "virtually every other statute designed to protect against un- 
lawful dis~rimination."~~ 
Where the Miener court had found that the establishment 
of a private right of action for injunctive relief could not be ex- 
tended to cover a damages remedy, the Patton court pointed out 
that earlier civil rights cases, whether arising under statutes or 
the Constitution, provided "no support . . . for the defendants' 
position that the underlying right to sue should be limited by 
the relief sought."70 
A. The Power of the Federal Courts to Fashion Remedies: 
Bell v. Hood 
The availability of damages under section 504 depends on 
the authority of the courts to fashion remedies in cases based on 
rights of action implied rather than explicit in statutes. The Su- 
preme Court has dealt with a closely analogous problem in cases 
based on private rights of action implied in the Constitution. In 
Bell u. Hood,ll the Court found that a damages remedy could be 
65. Id. at 935 n.2. 
66. Id. at 936. 
67. Id. at 936-37. 
68. Id. at 937. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 938. 
71. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
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appropriate when it was necessary to protect individual rights 
implied in the Constitution. The Court spoke broadly of the 
power of the federal courts to grant compensatory relieE 
[Wlhere federally protected rights have been invaded, it has 
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it 
is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, 
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for 
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to 
make good the wrong done.'= 
The Court affirmed the Bell doctrine in two later cases. In 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
N a r ~ o t i c s , ~ ~  the Court pointed out that "[h]istorically, damages 
have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of 
personal interests in liberty."?' Bivens established the right of a 
citizen to recover damages based on the Fourth Amendment.?' 
The most recent extension of the broad Bell statement con- 
cerning authority to grant a damages remedy, Davis u. Pass- 
man,16 involved a damages claim asserted under the Fifth 
Amendment.77 In Passman, the Court again looked at the his- 
tory of damages remedies since Bell and attempted to distin- 
guish between the question of implying a right of action and 
that of determining the appropriate remedy to be granted once 
the right has been found to exist: "[Tlhe question whether a liti- 
gant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and prior to 
the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to 
re~eive."'~ The Passman Court criticized the court of appeals for 
confusing the two questions, pointing out that "[a] plaintiff may 
have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at 
all."7e In other words, the Supreme Court outlined a two-step 
approach to resolving the question of whether damages may be 
an appropriate remedy for private rights of action based on the 
Constitution: First, a court should determine whether or not the 
72. Id. at 684 (footnotes omitted). 
73. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
Id. at 395. 
Id. at 397. 
442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
Id. at 231. 
Id. at 239. This distinction has been criticized. See 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 180- 
79. 442 U.S. at 239-40 n.18. 
144 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
right of action asserted by the plaintiff may be properly inferred 
from the Constitution; and, second, if a right can be inferred, a 
court should determine whether or not damages is an appropri- 
ate remedy. 
B. Remedies in Statutorily Implied Rights of Action 
The Supreme Court's two-step approach in Passman is 
readily adapted to the determination of appropriate remedies 
for rights of action implied in a statute. The Court's traditional 
broad recognition of the federal courts' authority to choose be- 
tween remedies was applied to cases involving statutorily im- 
plied rights of action as part of the argument in Bivens. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Harlan relied on the federal courts' 
general authority to fashion appropriate remedies for statutorily 
implied private rights of action to justify the Court's determina- 
tion that damages could be appropriate when the Constitution 
was the source of the right: 
The contention that the federal courts are powerless to ac- 
cord a litigant damages for a claimed invasion of his federal 
constitutional rights until Congress explicitly authorizes the 
remedy cannot rest on the notion that the decision to grant 
compensatory relief involves a resolution of policy considera- 
tions not susceptible of judicial discernment. Thus, in suits for 
damages based on violation of federal statutes lacking any ex- 
press authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has autho- 
rized such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to 
effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substan- 
tive provisions of the statute. 
. . . I do not think that the fact that the interest is pro- 
tected by the Constitution rather than statute or common law 
justifies the assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant 
damages in the absence of explicit congressional action autho- 
rizing the remedy. . . . [Tlhe federal judiciary [is] . . . compe- 
tent to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies 
to implement statutory and common-law policies . . . . 80 
Justice Harlan found his authority in a number of earlier deci- 
sions in which the Court granted relief in suits brought on the 
basis of private rights of action implied in statutes. The princi- 
pal authority cited by Justice Harlan was J. I. Case Co. v. 
80. 403 U.S. at 402-03 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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Borak,'l "an especially clear example of the exercise of federal 
judicial power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in 
the absence of any express statutory authorization of a federal 
cause of action."82 
The Court in J. I. Case decided a claim based on a failure to 
comply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934F The Act had 
made various trading practices illegal without providing private 
remedies for some of them? The Court recognized its duty to 
"be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make ef- 
fective the congressional purpose" by finding that the effective 
enforcement of the Act required more than the resources and 
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission could pro- 
vide? Private damage suits were found to be an appropriate 
method of securing proper enforcement and effectuating the 
stated goals of the statute? 
Since J. I. Case, federal courts have taken a mixed view of 
the appropriateness of granting damages in implied right of ac- 
tion cases.'' The differing results may be explained by the na- 
ture of the statutes and the rights they were designed to protect. 
The courts have been more willing to recognize private rights of 
action in cases based on statutes intended to protect individual 
rights than in cases based on statutes designed for economic reg- 
ulation." This distinction was most graphically illustrated in 
1970, when the Supreme Court sustained a lower court's finding 
that a private right of action was not implied in an economic 
regulation statute? Only twelve days earlier the Court had held 
that a private right of action was implied in Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act,BO one of the statutes on which section 504 was 
81. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
82. 403 U.S. at 402 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
83. 377 U.S. at  429-30. 
84. See id. at  431-32. 
85. Id. at  432-34. 
86. Id. at. 434-35. 
87. See, e.g., United States v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 621 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 
1980) (private right of action denied under the Davis-Bacon Act); Zeffiro v. First Penn. 
Banking and Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290, 294-98 (3d Cir. 1980) (private right implied under 
Trust Indenture Act); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 
216, 233-35 (6th Cir. 1980) (private right of action implied under 1974 amendments to 
the Commodities Exchange Act). 
88. See Implied Rights of Action, supra note 1, at  1236-39. 
89. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 
453 (1974) (decided Jan. 9, 1974) (no private right of action implied in the Rail Passen- 
ger Service Act of 1970). 
90. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (decided Jan. 21, 1974). 
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modeled. 
The Court's refusal to find implied actions in two 1979 deci- 
sions involving economic regulation:' in contrast to its treat- 
ment of a civil rights case in the same year:2 suggests that the 
distinction retains its validity. The two cases based on economic 
regulation statutes showed the Court moving toward a strict 
statutory construction approach to implied rights of action." On 
the other hand, the Court did not use that strict approach when 
it held that a private right of action was implied in Title IX. 
Section 504 is the kind of civil rights statute that requires 
the more liberal approach. The federal courts, applying the two- 
step analysis outlined in Passman, should recognize first that, as 
various circuit courts have indicated, a private right of action is 
implied in section 504 and, second, that damages may be an ap- 
propriate remedy for vindicating section 504 rights. 
When a federal court finds that there is a private right of 
action implied in section 504 and that damages may be an ap- 
propriate remedy, it must still determine whether or not dam- 
ages should be allowed in the particular case with which it is 
presented. Unlike situations in which Congress has explicitly 
provided for a damages remedy, courts facing implied private 
rights of action cannot simply say that compensatory relief is 
appropriate and proceed to grant it. 
The decision whether to grant damages, like that of the ex- 
istence of the private right of action itself, depends on whether 
the remedy is essential to achieve the statutory purpose. That 
determination has two elements: First, the proof that there is no 
mechanism provided which can achieve the purpose; and, sec- 
ond, the showing that the damages remedy would, given the pol- 
icy considerations involved, achieve a purpose within the con- 
templation of Congress at the time the statute was enacted. 
91. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
92. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (sustained a finding that a 
private right of action existed under Title IX). 
93. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 520, 568 (1979). See akro Comment, Implied 
Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Lcrw 
Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 355 (1980). 
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A. Absence of a Mechanism to Enforce Section 504 Rights 
1.  Failure to provide an adequate statutory remedy 
The Supreme Court has sustained damages awards where 
"damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy 
underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute."s4 In or- 
der to show that a damages remedy is "necessary," it is essential 
that there be no statutory mechanism that can effectuate the 
statutory purpose. The failure to provide such a mechanism may 
be either direct or indirect. Congress may fail completely to pro- 
vide a mechanism for relief, directly preventing the implementa- 
tion of the policy without judicial enforcement? Or, Congress 
may provide a remedy but limit it or its application in ways that 
make vindication of the statutory right impossible. The limita- 
tions may be either a failure to provide the resources necessary 
for enforcement (as in J.I. Case Co. u. Borakss) or a restriction 
of the remedies granted to the enforcing agency to those 
designed "solely to benefit the agencies themselves or the Fed- 
eral government as a whole" (i.e., to enable agencies to comply 
with the law) rather than to benefit those individuals to be pro- 
tected by the statutory policy." When Congress so acts, it may 
indirectly negate its own policy, often forcing the courts to pro- 
duce means of enforcement. 
Sometimes, however, in the situation where the statute it- 
self does not provide a remedy, a remedy may be provided by 
Executive order. But the Executive order may also fail to 
achieve the purpose of the statute, and it may neglect to provide 
an effective mechanism for the vindication of individual rights 
guaranteed by the order. Or, even if an effective mechanism is 
provided, there may be a failure to dedicate to that remedy the 
resources necessary for its effectuation. Either failure would be 
sufficient to make judicial provision of an effective remedy 
6 6 necessary." 
2. Failure of administrative and injunctive relief 
Section 504 declared a federal policy opposing discrimina- 
94. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 
402 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
95. See Implied Rights of Action, supra note 1,  at 1236-37. 
96. 377 U.S. at 432-33. 
97. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 100 S.Ct. 960, 968 
(1980). 
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tion against the handicapped but did not specify a preventative 
mechanism. The remedy provided by Executive Order No. 11914 
for violations of section 504 was the withdrawal of federal funds 
from the offending program." The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS)09 has been unable to provide the kind of 
supervision of federal grant programs necessary to ensure that 
federal funds are not used in programs which discriminate 
against handicapped persons. HHS is forced to rely on individ- 
ual complaints to initiate investigations, and even when such 
complaints are filed "there is 'a large backlog . . . and there is 
no guarantee that any newly filed complaint can be investigated 
and resolved in an expeditious manner.' "loo 
Even if HHS could keep up with the incoming complaints 
and effectively police federally funded programs, the remeily 
provided by the Executive order is inadequate to provide relief 
to those injured by section 504 violations.lol The situations 
presented in Miener and Patton are illustrative. Terri Ann 
Miener and William Patton had been deprived of appropriate 
98. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 8 3, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 794 
app., at  881 (1976). 
99. Id. The responsibility for enforcement, originally delegated to the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, now resides in its successor, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). 
100. Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ. 461 F. Supp. 99, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (cit- 
ing Justice Department's amicus brief) (footnote omitted). A similar situation exists in 
Title IX enforcement. "Federal enforcement has hardly been energetic: more than a hun- 
dred complaints are backed up and no school has lost a dime for noncompliance." Of 
Sports, Sex and Money, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1981, at 98,100. Proposed cuts in budgets 
of federal agencies, including HHS, will make reduction of the backlog difEcult if not 
impossible. 
101. 
This cutting off of funds is, effectively, the only sanction that H.E.W. can 
impose. Nowhere is the H.E.W. authorized to issue a binding order that dam- 
ages be paid to an individual who has suffered by reason of a section 504 viola- 
tion. Nor is the H.E.W. authorized to order the reinstatement of an individual 
who has been discharged in violation of that section. Moreover, while an indi- 
vidual may file a complaint and thereby possibly trigger an H.E.W. investiga- 
tion, he does not become a party to any proceedings between the H.E.W. and 
the alleged violator. 45 C.F.R. 8 81.23. Indeed, the only relationship that he 
may have with these proceedings is the receipt of a notice that an administra- 
tive hearing is going to be held to determine whether funds should be cut off. 
In short, while the administrative process may effectively provide, by way of 
the threat of a funding termination, an incentive to comply with section 504, it 
provides no means by which an individual can obtain personal redress for a 
section 504 violation. Thus, by their very terms, the regulations do not provide 
a "meaningful enforcement mechanism" for the vindication of personal rights. 
F. Supp. at 107-08 (footnotes omitted). 
1331 COMPENSATING THE HANDICAPPED 149 
educational opportunities for a number of years before their 
suits reached trial.lo2Withdrawal of federal funds from their re- 
spective school systems, the only remedy open to HHS, would 
do nothing to remedy their losses. In fact, withdrawal of funds 
might prevent the school systems from providing future assis- 
tance to Miener, Patton, and other handicapped children by re- 
moving the resources necessary to provide that assistance; the 
administrative remedy might be worse than no remedy at all. 
Intervention by the courts would not change the situation; 
withdrawing federal funds would not achieve the purposes of the 
statute. If the courts refuse compensatory relief, they would in 
effect be sanctioning the decision of the school systems to delay 
compliance with section 504 until forced to do so by court order. 
But refusal to end funding, without providing another remedy, 
would be worse. It would sanction continued discrimination. 
Such approval would defeat the purposes of section 504. Com- 
pensation in the form of damages, therefore, is arguably "essen- 
tial" or "indispensable for vindicating" the rights guaranteed by 
section 504. 
B. Policy Considerations in Determining the 
Appropriateness of Damages 
1. Establishment of appropriate policy criteria: Passman 
The traditional "necessity" test allows the courts to look not 
only at the existence of statutory, administrative, and injunctive 
remedies but at the policy implications of allowing a damages 
recovery as well. This analysis is an essential part of the second 
half of the necessity approach. The remedy must be necessary to 
effectuate the congressional purpose. Mr. Justice Harlan pointed 
out in Bivens that the necessity question was essential, but that 
"[iln resolving that question, it seems . . . that the range of pol- 
icy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad 
as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to 
an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy."loS 
The policy considerations involved in section 504 are signifi- 
cant. The indispensability of the damages remedy must be bal- 
102. 498 F. Supp. at 945-46; Patton v. Dumpson, 425 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
103. 403 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 19 & 
24, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971)). 
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anced against the potential impact of that remedy on federally 
funded programs. Even without the additional cost of providing 
damages to victims of discrimination, recipients of federal funds 
will spend millions of dollars complying with the section 504 re- 
quirements.lM The added burden imposed by making damages 
available to handicapped plaintiffs requires that courts closely 
scrutinize the facts giving rise to the damages claim. 
The Supreme Court provided an outline of the policy con- 
siderations to be used in that scrutiny when it sustained a dam- 
ages award in Davis v. Passman.lo6 Davis had been employed on 
the st& of United States Representative Otto Passman. Fired 
from her position as deputy administrative assistant, Davis al- 
leged that her removal was solely because of her sex.lO" Because 
she was employed by the House of Representatives, which had 
exempted itself from statutory coverage,lo7 Davis was unable to 
assert a statutory claim. The Court found her right of action im- 
plied in the Constitution.lo8 
The Court in Passman used four criterialOe to evaluate the 
merits of Davis' claim for compensatory relief. First, the Court 
looked at  the historical basis for recovery of damages in similar 
suits.l1° Since courts have traditionally granted such recovery in 
employment discrimination cases, the Court found no barrier to 
a damages award in Davis' case. Second, the Court considered 
the practicality of determining the amount to be paid as dam- 
ages."' Again, the traditional use of damages as a remedy for 
employment discrimination had given the courts sufficient ex- 
104. For example, the cost of making the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority 
facilities accessible to the handicapped would be at  least $1.5 billion, plus an additional 
$100,000,000 in maintenance costs. Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1980, at  30, col. 1. 
105. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
106. After being dismissed from her position on Representative Passman's staff, Ma. 
Davis received a letter giving the reasons for her dismissal: 
"Certainly you command the respect of those with whom you work; however, 
on account of the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the 
diversity of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to 
my Administrative Assistant be a man. I believe you will agree with this 
conclusion." 
Id. at  320-31 n.3. 
107. Although there was no specific exemption in the statute, it was carefully drawn 
so as to exclude any coverage of congressional employees. Civil Rights Act of 1964,s 717, 
42 U.S.C. 3 2000e--16 (1976). 
108. 442 U.S. at 244. 
109. Id. at  245-48. 
110. Id. at  245. 
111. Id. 
1331 COMPENSATING THE HANDICAPPED 151 
pertise in determining the kind of backpay awards required in 
damages recovery. The Court next reviewed the relevant legisla- 
tive history of employment discrimination statutes for indica- 
tions that Congress might have explicitly declared that such re- 
covery could not be given."' Findy, since there was no such 
statement in the history, the Court moved to consideration of 
the impact that granting damages recovery in such cases would 
have on the judiciary.l18 The Court rejected the contention of 
the court of appeals that granting damages to Davis would 
"delug[e] the federal courts with claims."ll4 
2. Application of the Passman policy criteria to section 504 
The use of the Passman criteria, applied as part of the 
traditional necessity test, would provide federal courts with an 
approach to determining whether damages would be an appro- 
priate remedy for section 504 violations. This approach lies 
somewhere between those taken in Miener and Patton. Miener 
relied on the Cort criteria to simultaneously determine the ques- 
tion of the existence of a private right of action and the question 
of the remedy to be granted.l15 Concluding that any damages 
award would be inconsistent with the purpose of section 504,"' 
the Miener court's approach neglected to address the policy fac- 
tors essential to fairly answering the question of the necessity of 
a damages remedy to achieve the declared purpose of section 
504's broad mandate. The Patton approach, relying on the de- 
termination that Congress did not preclude a damages remedy"' 
and that damages would be necessary to redress the wrongs al- 
legedly suffered by William Patton,lla also ignored the essential 
policy considerations that must enter into a determination of 
the potential adverse impacta of section 504 damages awards. 
The Passman approach would allow recovery of damages 
only if the court were to find, after evaluating the appropriate 
policy considerations, that damages were essential to achieving 
the integration of handicapped citizens into programs as Con- 
gress intended. If necessity alone, without policy considerations, 
112. Id. at 246-47. 
113. Id. at 248. 
114. Id. 
115. 498 F.  Supp. at 948. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 937-38. 
118. Id. at 939. 
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were to be the test, damages would be appropriate in all cases 
because the mechanism set up to remedy section 504 violations 
contains no provision for addressing individual wrongs. The ad- 
dition of the Passman policy considerations qualifies that result, 
allowing damages awards in those cases where they are consis- 
tent with the policies underlying the statute. 
In the Miener and Patton situations, it is far from certain 
that courts properly evaluating the four policy criteria would 
grant damages. First, plaintiffs would have to show that dam- 
ages have historically been awarded for the kinds of discrimina- 
tion demonstrated. Although such proof may be found, it is cer- 
tainly less extant than in employment discrimination cases such 
as Passman. Second, the plaintiffs must show that damages 
awards are "practical." Again, the difference between employ- 
ment discrimination and the failure of a school system to pro- 
vide educational opportunities is significant; although a court 
can determine the wages a person has lost due to discrimination 
in employment, there is no easy formula for determining the 
value of lost educational opportunity. Can any award truly com- 
pensate for the years of educational assistance a plaintiff should 
have received? Third, the plaintiffs will have to demonstrate 
that the legislative history contains no indication that a damages 
remedy was to be precluded-a point some have disputed when 
looking at section 504's history, despite the lack of a clear indi- 
cation of any legislative intent in passing the statute.ll@ Finally, 
the court will have to look at the impact allowing damages 
would have on the judiciary. Despite the large number of pro- 
spective plaintiffs,120 the small number of damage suits brought 
so far suggests that the burden on the judiciary of allowing dam- 
ages under section 504 would not alone justify denial of this 
remedy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although federal courts have been willing to use injunctive 
relief to protect the rights granted to handicapped citizens 
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, they have 
119. See, e.g., 498 F. Supp. at 948. 
120. "The [I9701 Census also showed there were 11,265,000 persons [16 to 64 years 
old] . . . with disabilities which existed for six months or longer. Excluded were persons 
in institutions." PRESIDENT'S COMM~ITEE ON MPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, ONE IN 
ELEVEN 2 (1975). 
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had trouble resolving the question of compensatory relief. The 
courts that have faced the question have treated the issues of 
the existence of an implied private right of action under the 
statute and the appropriateness of a damages remedy as a single 
issue. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis u. Passman, al- 
though directed to a constitutionally implied private right of ac- 
tion, provides courts with a model for a step-by-step analysis of 
the issue. The court should first determine whether a private 
right of action can be fairly implied under section 504. Only if 
such a right is found to exist should the court then proceed to 
answer the separate question of the appropriateness of damages. 
Davis u. Passman provides criteria that courts can use to 
determine the appropriateness of damages in specific cases. The 
court should consider the historical use of damages as a remedy 
in similar cases, the practicality of determining the amount of 
damages to be granted, the legislative history of the statute giv- 
ing rise to the implied private right of action, and the impact of 
the availability of a damages remedy on the judiciary. These fac- 
tors provide the policy considerations that courts must consider 
in deciding whether to extend the coverage of section 504 and 
similar statutes to include compensatory relief. 
James R. Layton 
